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Eurobond Yields and Market Liquidity

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1. Yields and market liquidity
2. Bid-ask spreads
3. Eurobond market
4. Dataset
5. Determinants of liquidity and yields
6. Effect of liquidity on yields
7. Take-aways

Central themes in finance

- What determines yields?
- What makes a market liquid?
- Extensive theory and empirical research

Central theme in finance


- “Market liquidity” complex
 - Can trade reasonable amount
 - Reasonably quickly
 - Reasonably cheaply
 - With minimal price impact
- Can vary over time
 - Depends on behavior, not asset features
 - Feedback loops

Theory

- Market liquidity offers “convenience yield”
 - Can adjust position quickly and cheaply in response to
 - New information
 - New liquidity need
 - Better price discovery
 - Valuable to both investors and issuers

Theory

- Yield and market liquidity interact



Empirical

- (II-)Liquidity measures
 - Price based
 - e.g., bid-ask spread; “flipping” between bid and offer
 - Volume based
 - e.g., turnover; order book

- All price based measures usually perform similarly
 - Bid-ask spread robust
 - Volume based measures are complementary

Empirical

- Yields on assets tend to increase with illiquidity
 - Both in cross-section and over time
 - Especially in stress periods
 - Especially for lower-rated assets
 - Various asset classes
 - Corporate bonds
 - US and European sovereign bonds
 - Similar results for equity

Yields, market liquidity, and the bid-ask spread

Theory

- Bid-ask spread can reflect
 - Operating costs
 - “Cost of carry” of dealer’s inventory
 - Dealer market power
 - In providing immediacy
 - Dealer’s risk of facing informed trader

Yields, market liquidity, and the bid-ask spread

Theory

- Bid-ask spread negatively related to market liquidity
- “Modest” bid-ask spread is necessary but not sufficient for market liquidity

Yields, market liquidity, and the bid-ask spread

Empirical

- Bid-ask spread on advanced economy bonds depends on
 - Issue volume (-)
 - Duration
 - Remaining maturity (+)
 - Coupon (-)
 - Age (+)
 - Risk (+)
 - Yield to maturity (+)
 - Yield is endogenous
- Yields have similar determinants

Eurobond characteristics

- Medium-term fixed-interest bonds
- Issued in major foreign jurisdiction
 - Typically under New York or English law
- Denominated in major currency
 - Predominantly US\$
- Sold OTC
- (Informal) dealers post bids and offers
- Recorded in international central securities depositories
- Largely standardized contracts
 - (enhanced) CACs
 - (modified) pari-passu clauses

Eurobonds: an important asset class

- EMDC sovereign Eurobonds
 - outstanding > \$1.5 trillion
 - >80 issuers
 - >50 issues/year
- EMDC non-sovereign Eurobonds > \$0.5 trillion
- Some advanced country issuers

Eurobonds: an important asset class

- Conduit for capital flows to and from EMDCs
 - Finance development
- Means of portfolio diversification
 - Special indices, e.g., EMBIG
- Focus of debt restructurings
- Yield premium is taken as signal of creditworthiness

Relatively

- Homogeneous
 - Currency
 - Term
- Relevant differences
 - Issue size
 - Credit rating
 - Some contractual provisions
- Easy but not highly automated trading

=> Worthwhile and suited to empirical investigation

Empirical

- Eurobond yields affected by
 - Global rates
 - Credit rating
 - Duration
 - Inclusion of an (enhanced) CAC
 - Effects depend on credit rating
 - Jurisdiction of issue
 - Effects depend on credit rating

Yields, market liquidity, and the bid-ask spread

Hypotheses

- Large, diverse, active investor base and thus narrow bid-ask spread related to
 - Issue volume
 - Total country issuance
 - Consistent issue pattern
 - Yield on alternatives
 - Moderate duration
 - Young age
 - Moderate sovereign risk
 - Coupon
- } Investors' research worthwhile

Yields, market liquidity, and the bid-ask spread

Hypotheses

- Large diverse investor base and thus narrow bid-ask spread related to
 - Fixed effects
 - Inclusion in a bond index
 - Jurisdiction of issuance
 - Presence of an (enhance) CAC or (modified) pari-passu clause
 - Market evolution
- Similar influences on yield
- Feedback between yield and b-a spread

- End-quarter observations (March 2017–March 2019) on Eurobond and country characteristics, e.g.,
 - Yield to maturity (YLD)
 - Bid-ask spread (BAS)
 - Volume outstanding (VOL)
 - Maturity (MAT)
 - Credit rating (CRR)
 - Converted to numeric scale


- Dummies constructed, e.g.,
 - Issuance under New York law (D_NY_LAW)
 - Inclusion of an enhanced CAC (D_E_CAC)

- Some variables observed both at time of issue (_ISS) and contemporaneously (_NOW)
 - Former relevant to DMO and initial investors

- Focus on EMDC US\$-denominated bonds
 - Total of over 4750 observations
 - Some extreme outliers
 - Mostly associated with debt default and restructuring cases
 - e.g., Venezuela
 - Regressions based on a trimmed sample of about 4300 observations
 - Some explanatory variables missing


Summary features

- Asymmetry




Summary features

- Correlations




- Non-linear relations



Summary features

- Collinearity



Specification

- Bid-ask spread or yield on explanatory variables
 - Parameters “incorporate”
 - Direct effect of explanatory variable
 - Feedback between bid-ask spread and yield
 - Variables clearly pre-determined or exogenous
 - Many set at time of issuance
 - Others reflect persistent country characteristics

Specification

- Translog
 - Flexible form
 - Logs for normality
 - Limited cross products
 - Only with when-issued credit risk rating terms
 - Dummies for observation periods
 - Fixed effects capture global state
 - Safe interest rate
 - Risk sentiment

Reduced form regressions

Specification

■ Translog

$$LY = \sum_i^I (\alpha_{1i} LX_i + \alpha_{2i} LX_SQ_i + \alpha_{3i} LX_LCRR_I_i + \alpha_{4i} LX_LCRR_I_SQ_i) + \sum_j^{J-1} (\beta_j D_period_j) + \sum_k^{K-1} (\gamma_k D_ISSUE_YR_k) + CONSTANT$$

log level log squared cross-product with LCRR_ISS cross-product with LCRR_ISS_SQ

period dummies issue year dummies

Reduced form regressions

- Hard to interpret
 - Tables complex
- => project effect on levels
- For typical values of variables

Table 4: Log bid-ask spread determinants; reduced form regressions

	Full sample			Robust regression		Trimmed sample		Semi-trimmed sample		First half of sample		Second half of sample	
	coef	se	convar-corr up	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se
LVOL_SQ	0.061***	1.136	0.009	0.100***	0.918	0.101***	1.030	0.066***	0.821	0.020***	1.096	0.107***	1.263
LVOL_SQ_SQ	-0.006	0.018	0.007	0.022	0.016	-0.021	0.016	-0.022**	0.010	-0.005	0.025	-0.019	0.029
LVOL_SQ_CRRJ	-0.021**	1.136	0.003	-0.077***	0.716	-0.362***	0.681	-0.075**	0.490	-0.042***	1.046	-0.162***	1.060
LVOL_SQ_CRRJ_SQ	0.000**	0.021	0.002	0.061**	0.051	0.027**	0.053	0.008*	0.046	0.007***	0.035	0.015**	0.208
CHG_LVOL	-0.027***	1.675	2.910	-0.262***	2.701	-1.008***	1.020	-0.023***	2.012	-0.112***	1.636	-0.274***	6.157
CHG_LVOL_SQ	0.102**	0.056	0.008	0.171**	0.055	0.102**	0.068	0.161**	0.036	0.191**	0.075	0.005	0.075
CHG_LVOL_CRRJ	2.190***	3.036	2.307	16.199***	2.162	15.358***	3.218	75.36***	1.524	19.945***	3.815	28.859***	4.685
CHG_LVOL_CRRJ_SQ	-1.462***	0.050	0.051	-1.362***	0.021	-1.102***	0.028	-1.038***	0.010	-1.088***	0.070	-1.072***	0.087
D_LVOL_SQ_1000	-0.016**	0.007	0.006	-0.110***	0.041	0.060***	0.031	-0.115***	0.025	-0.190***	0.046	-0.008	0.059
D_LVOL_SQ_1000_SQ	-0.008**	0.019	0.018	-0.068***	0.017	0.074**	0.016	-0.034**	0.011	-0.131***	0.025	-0.052*	0.029
D_LVOL_SQ_1000_CRRJ	-0.008**	0.013	0.014	-0.040***	0.013	0.032**	0.012	-0.048***	0.006	-0.032*	0.018	-0.057**	0.019
D_LVOL_SQ_1000_SQ_CRRJ	-0.004*	0.011	0.015	-0.009	0.014	0.008	0.012	0.002	0.008	0.028	0.020	0.011	0.019
D_LVOL_SQ_1000_CRRJ_SQ	-0.010	0.023	0.020	-0.015	0.019	0.030	0.021	0.025*	0.010	-0.041	0.012	-0.013	0.082
LVOL_CRRJ	-0.028	0.058	0.050	-0.007	0.400	-0.145	0.360	-0.171	0.235	0.014	0.791	-1.261**	0.459
LVOL_CRRJ_SQ	0.008	0.006	0.003	0.008	0.003	0.007	0.003	0.004	0.002	-0.005*	0.003	0.013**	0.005
LVOL_CRRJ_CRRJ	-0.064*	0.042	0.352	-0.077	0.327	0.000	0.314	0.116	0.235	0.141	0.625	0.051**	0.276
LVOL_CRRJ_CRRJ_SQ	0.036	0.076	0.071	0.017	0.066	-0.035	0.062	-0.023	0.040	0.005*	0.125	-0.108*	0.076
DAWG_LVOL	-2.400**	1.611	1.167	-4.013***	1.005	-2.259**	1.111	-1.319**	0.678	-2.811	1.919	-6.880**	1.361
DAWG_LVOL_SQ	0.019	0.017	0.016	-0.006	0.015	0.020	0.014	-0.007	0.006	0.022	0.023	0.008	0.026
DAWG_LVOL_CRRJ	2.987**	1.067	0.927	3.180***	0.860	2.710**	0.877	3.145**	0.516	2.213	1.196	5.018**	1.118
DAWG_LVOL_CRRJ_SQ	-0.077**	0.013	0.186	-0.041**	0.073	0.162**	0.071	-0.025**	0.018	-0.116	0.040	-1.121**	0.222
UMAT_NOW_DMC	-0.215	2.235	2.073	-0.136	1.925	-1.708	2.261	-1.201**	1.376	1.150	3.140	-0.140**	1.906
UMAT_NOW_DMC_SQ	0.008	0.178	0.129	0.007	0.120	0.161	0.162	0.047*	0.096	0.261	0.236	2.921**	1.218
UMAT_NOW_DMC_CRRJ	-0.221	1.150	1.200	-0.176	1.162	0.136	1.001	0.072	0.675	0.265	1.890	2.196	1.073
UMAT_NOW_DMC_CRRJ_SQ	-0.025	0.226	0.267	0.013	0.229	-0.130	0.217	-0.162	0.131	0.119	0.176	-0.142	0.271
UMAT_NOW_CRRJ	0.178	0.045	0.209	-0.110	0.073	1.008**	0.116	0.681**	0.027	0.461	0.668	0.253	0.023
UMAT_NOW_CRRJ_SQ	-0.058**	0.012	0.011	-0.057**	0.010	0.012**	0.009	-0.008	0.006	-0.021**	0.018	-0.071**	0.015
UMAT_NOW_CRRJ_CRRJ	0.015	0.181	0.416	0.046	0.366	-0.013	0.361	-0.025**	0.217	0.005	0.576	0.281	0.191
UMAT_NOW_CRRJ_CRRJ_SQ	-0.005	0.076	0.063	-0.004	0.077	0.101	0.068	0.140**	0.040	-0.025	0.111	-0.068	0.103
CHG_UMAT	-0.700	0.675	0.866	0.178	0.852	-1.460**	0.681	-1.102**	0.516	0.459	1.521	0.063	1.001
CHG_UMAT_SQ	0.071**	0.021	0.019	0.064**	0.016	0.020**	0.018	0.021**	0.012	0.075**	0.022	0.047**	0.027
CHG_UMAT_CRRJ	0.073	0.710	0.726	-0.718	0.671	1.072	0.825	1.125**	0.415	-1.121	1.071	-0.512	0.671
CHG_UMAT_CRRJ_SQ	0.028	0.141	0.145	0.192	0.135	-0.108	0.118	-0.176**	0.062	0.265	0.215	0.140	0.150
L_CRRJ_SQ	-0.612	6.258	6.357	-18.883**	6.068	-11.410*	6.119	-1.192	3.617	-10.060	10.516	-2.2730	27.850
L_CRRJ_SQ_SQ	15.31	12.61	1.320	3.169*	1.225	2.524**	1.229	0.308	0.726	1.328	2.096	4.562	5.767
CHG_CRRJ	-0.118	0.196	0.456	0.425	0.405	0.919**	0.413	-1.645**	0.261	-1.572**	0.615	1.751**	0.762
CHG_CRRJ_SQ	-0.111	0.105	0.061	-0.287**	0.061	0.310**	0.068	0.122*	0.052	0.260*	0.130	-0.387**	0.159
L_CRRJ_CRRJ	0.008	1.194	0.070	-0.711**	0.908	3.928**	1.112	2.738**	0.492	0.979	1.546	0.628	1.814
L_CRRJ_CRRJ_SQ	-0.024**	0.045	0.037	-0.140**	0.035	-0.021	0.042	-0.020**	0.025	-0.020**	0.007	-0.362**	0.063
L_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ	1.040	0.069	0.726	4.723**	0.071	3.111**	0.029	-1.001**	0.047	0.023	12.48	0.775	1.261
L_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_SQ	-0.023	0.175	0.149	-0.060**	0.118	0.272**	0.101	0.081	0.098	0.004	0.271	-0.222	0.241
D_UMAT_CRRJ	0.196	0.146	0.305	0.152	0.459	0.238	0.368	0.209*	0.218	0.710	0.657	-0.146	0.356
D_UMAT_CRRJ_SQ	-0.086	0.161	0.410	-0.111	0.361	-0.025	0.322	-0.074*	0.206	0.259	0.512	0.126	0.453
D_UMAT_CRRJ_CRRJ	-0.017	0.072	0.062	-0.002	0.077	-0.007	0.064	-0.108**	0.045	0.019	0.187	-0.181	0.061
D_UMAT_CRRJ_CRRJ_SQ	1.021**	0.076	0.327	2.082**	0.227	0.716	0.462	2.019**	0.106	1.216	0.610	2.721**	0.264
D_UMAT_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ	-1.219**	0.071	0.456	-1.570**	0.153	-0.616	0.362	-1.628**	0.216	0.426	0.628	-2.582**	0.267
D_UMAT_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_SQ	0.210*	0.065	0.065	0.262**	0.068	0.121	0.079	0.134**	0.020	0.149	0.136	0.411**	0.114
D_UMAT_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ	-0.056	0.077	0.307	-0.403**	0.151	-1.480**	0.269	0.388	0.492	-0.362	0.678	-0.546	1.037
D_UMAT_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_SQ	0.602	0.056	0.042	2.368**	0.264	1.307**	0.091	-0.080	0.169	0.413	0.778	0.513	0.854
D_UMAT_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ	-0.123	0.118	0.110	-0.070**	0.121	0.310**	0.127	-0.002	0.072	-0.072	0.136	-0.122	0.171
D_UMAT_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_SQ	-0.061**	0.079	0.052	-0.100**	0.079	-1.458**	0.061	-2.194**	0.192	-1.615**	1.236	-5.761**	1.069
D_UMAT_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ	4.062**	0.711	0.702	6.069**	0.451	4.107**	0.096	2.092**	0.196	3.876**	1.028	4.579**	0.861
D_UMAT_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_CRRJ_SQ	-0.001**	0.149	0.143	-1.199**	0.133	0.482**	0.119	-0.125**	0.080	-0.752**	0.207	-0.401**	0.181

Hsides: Obs: period-dummies
 Year-dummies
 Country-dummies
 CONS
 Number of observations: 4,314
 Adjusted R²: 0.066
 Source: Sveriges Riksbank
 Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Specification

■ Collinearity problem



- Examples
 - Log level and log squared terms
 - Log level and cross-product with CRR
 - CAC and pari-passu dummies
- Hence
 - Use of differences as RHS variables
 - e.g., issue-period log-level and change to current period
 - No specification search
 - Wald (F) tests for groups of parameter estimates
 - Only CAC dummies
 - no pari-passu dummies

Influence of bond and country characteristics

- Good explanatory power
 - $R^2 > 0.66$
- Interpretable results
 - Mostly consistent with hypotheses
- Many highly significant individual parameter estimates
- Many highly significant groups of parameter estimates

Influence of bond and country characteristics

■ Issue size





■ Large effects

■ Threshold effects and non-linearities

Influence of bond and country characteristics



■ Change in volume



- Large liability management operations eventually reduce liquidity and increase yield

Influence of bond and country characteristics

■ Country volume





■ Relatively modest

- Extra results: larger country volume reduces b-a-s for small issuers

Influence of bond and country characteristics



■ Deviation from country average



■ Relatively modest

Influence of bond and country characteristics



■ US yields



■ Insignificant for bid-ask spread

Influence of bond and country characteristics



■ Current maturity



■ Strong effect, independent of rating

Influence of bond and country characteristics



■ Seasoning



■ Age matters shortly before maturity

Influence of bond and country characteristics



■ Coupon rate



- May signal credit risk rather than affect duration
 - Matters mainly for low-rated issuers

Influence of bond and country characteristics

■ Issue year





■ Market has matured

- Fewer unusual years later in sample

Influence of bond and country characteristics

■ Credit rating when issued





■ Effect persistent

- Effect on b-a-s of low-rated issuers only

Influence of bond and country characteristics



■ Change in credit rating



■ Current credit rating also matters

Influence of bond and country characteristics



■ EMBIG inclusion



■ Modest effect

Influence of bond and country characteristics

■ Jurisdiction





■ Effect mainly for low-rated issuers



- Possibly: fear restructuring under NY law more costly for some investors

Influence of bond and country characteristics

■ Original CAC



■ Enhanced CAC



Influence of bond and country characteristics


Robustness

- Across samples
- Across estimation technique
- Inclusion of country dummies

- Exception: highly rated bonds
 - But still have good R^2


Influence of bond and country characteristics

- Error diagnostics:
 - Probit plots suggest normality with slight heteroskedasticity



Influence of bond and country characteristics

- Error diagnostics
 - Exception: highly rated bonds



Reduced form regressions

Using only variables known at time of issue

- Relevant for DMOs


- Drop
 - All fixed effects
 - Current volume, US\$ T-bond yields, and rating
- Adequate predictive power
 - $R^2 > 0.50$
- Most effects persist
 - Some stronger
 - e.g., issue volume

Effect of liquidity on yields

- Want to understand how yields and liquidity interact
 - Beyond common explanatory variables
 - No reliable instruments in sample
 - Over-identification or exogeneity tests failed
 - Statistically acceptable candidates are economically unintuitive
 - Not robust
- => Residuals on residuals regression

Effect of liquidity on yields

- Understand interaction after controlling for all explanatory variables
 - Residuals on residuals regression



Effect of liquidity on yields

- Residuals on residuals regression
 - Typically: 10 bps. reduction in b-a spread reduces yield by 20 bps.
 - Even after controlling for all other effects
 - Not very sensitive to credit risk

	Full sample			
	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
R_LBAS	0.681	0.723	0.185***	0.011
R_LBAS_SQ	0.105***	0.036	0.103***	0.036
R_LBAS_LCRR	-0.343	0.581	...	
R_LBAS_LCRR_SQ	0.057	0.116	...	
CONS	-0.004**	0.002	-0.004**	0.002
Number of observations	4,314		4,314	
Adjusted R2	0.107		0.106	
F tests				
R_LBAS=0; R_LBAS_SQ=0; R_LBAS_LCRR=0; R_LBAS_LCRR_SQ=0	F(4, 4309)	85.67***
R_LBAS=0; R_LBAS_SQ=0	F(2, 4309)	4.65***	F(2, 4311)	152.64***
R_LBAS_LCRR=0; R_LBAS_LCRR_SQ=0	F(2, 4309)	1.23

- Instrument design has economically significant effects on yields and bid-asks spreads
 - Initial issue volume
 - Current volume
 - Initial maturity
 - Current maturity
 - Coupon rate
 - Jurisdiction
 - Enhanced CAC

- Effects are long lasting
 - Investor base established at issuance endures
- Effects are non-linear
- Effects vary with credit risk
 - Bond-idiosyncratic features matter less for high investment-grade bonds
- Liquidity risk is priced in Eurobond yields
 - Affects interpretation of yield spreads

- Hence
 - Theories largely corroborated
 - Investors can trade off yield against liquidity
 - Careful debt management rewarded

- Approach could be applied elsewhere
 - e.g., functioning of EMDC local currency bond markets