Call for paper 2nd CEPR Conference Political Economy of Central Banks

Questions regarding central banks’ independence and their mandates have repeatedly drawn renewed interest, first in the context of legacy issues in financial crises, the COVID-19 shock and the world climate emergency. This concerns both their role as supervisors and monetary policy authorities. At the same time, technological evolution in finance also challenges the modus operandi of central banks. These broad questions have major political economy implications. The organising committee invites submissions of theoretical and empirical papers on these issues. Topics of interest for the conference include: 

  • The politics of central bank independence
  • Central bank power and COVID-19
  • Economists’ capture and central bank research
  • Private interests, lobbying, and central bank capture
  • Democratic institutions and the design of monetary and financial authorities
  • The (political) role of central banks in climate change
  • Political consequences of central bank policies
  • Independence and accountability in the conduct of monetary and financial policies
  • Central bank’s mandate and governance problems
  • Political economy aspects of central bank digital currencies
  • Political challenges in regulating FinTech
  • Financial repression and debt