At present, emerging countries still express criticism of the International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Since the end of the Bretton Woods agreements around 1970, many countries have been required to follow these programs, which have become a point of contention. Our goal in this discussion is to delve deeper into what we believe is the main issue at hand. As part of SAPs, the IMF typically offers emerging countries two possibilities that shape their economic trajectory. The first option involves state intervention, often achieved through the deliberate overvaluation of their national currencies. By artificially inflating the value of their currency, these countries aim to boost economic growth and stabilise their economies. However, the IMF also can deny the provision of foreign currencies or devalue the national currency. This second possibility would increase the demand for foreign currencies, ultimately leading to a subsequent jump in the overall economy. This paper examines and evaluates the consequences of these two behaviours dictated by the IMF within the framework of SAPs. It is imperative to delve into the potential effects of both choices on emerging countries, their economic stability, and the overall well-being of their populations. By critically analysing the outcomes, we hope to shed light on each approach's potential benefits and drawbacks, ultimately contributing to a richer understanding of these programs and their impacts on the global economy.

If we examine the lessons learned from the 1973 oil crisis, it becomes evident that the inefficiency of SAP currency values was exposed. However, the recent Asian currency crisis has demonstrated that any exchange rate can be a double-edged sword, presenting advantages and disadvantages. It is crucial to possess the knowledge and expertise in managing exchange rate devaluations, such as understanding the appropriate timing and extent of such measures. These devaluations can significantly boost economies, which has undoubtedly captured our attention. As we delve into contemporary years, we gain new insights into analysing the problems associated with SAPs. The collapse of Argentina has served as a catalyst, leading to the gradual reactivation of old and classical expenditure restraint levels. While political effects may not be our central focus, it remains intriguing to question the sustainability of these new effects. A pertinent inquiry arises as Argentina launches a new peso and strives to meet new international financial standards. Can the accumulation of foreign securities effectively offset the issue of import overvaluation? Furthermore, can foreign capital from "productive" overdeveloped countries serve as the ultimate solution to address the overwhelming debt burden of underdeveloped nations? This leads us to the ultimate question: under what conditions can currency devaluation stimulate an economy? Such a query deserves further investigation and analysis. By thoroughly examining the potential impact and consequences of money devaluation, we hope to shed light on the circumstances that genuinely facilitate economic growth.