Sovereign default decisions occur both in the extensive margin (whether or not to default) and in the intensive margin (how much to default). This paper focuses on the latter and builds on a partial default structural model with endogenous intensive margin decisions. In particular, I consider a fixed exchange rate regime environment where all nominal depreciations happen exogenously, and countries can decide how much to optimally default on their sovereign debt (partial default). I calibrate the model to the African Financial Community (CFA) franc zones, where the domestic currencies have been pegged to a foreign currency since 1945 (first the French franc and then the euro) with only one domestic nominal devaluation. The model demonstrates that nominal depreciations increase the debt burden on the economy, resulting in a higher percentage of partial defaults, which aligns with empirical evidence. In addition, a robust analysis shows that the existence of a sovereign default intensive margin reduces negative welfareeffects of nominal depreciations by about 25%.